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Abstract 
 The purpose of this thesis was to determine when it could be advantageous for two competing 
technology companies to cooperate with one another.  To answer this question, an illustrative case study 
of the Ashkelon desalination plant was analyzed against traditional theories and, once those theories were 
proven to be insufficient, a more refined contingency approach of cooperating for the future was 
proposed.  This thesis’ study revealed that a competing technological company can cooperate with a 
competitor, if their collaboration promises to result in a breakthrough technology or advancement for an 
emerging market.  In addition to the introduction of a contingency approach that is in favor of 
technological competitors cooperating, the final chapter also provided managerial advice to help 
understand and apply the cooperating for the future approach. 
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1. Introduction 
Hamel and Prahalad describe competition for the future thus, “Alliances are being 
formed, competencies are being assembled, and experiments are being conducted in nascent 
markets – all in hopes of capturing a share of the world’s future opportunities.  In this race to the 
future there are drivers, passengers, and road kill” (Hamel et al., 1994, 28).   Today the survival 
of companies depends on their ability to be innovative within their research and willing to form 
beneficial cooperative ventures.  
 Within this vein, the research question of this thesis is concerned with when it could be 
advantageous for two competing technology companies to cooperate with one another in an international 
joint venture.  In general, the term IJV is an alliance between two or more companies to create a 
new organization, either permanently or temporarily, that is distinct from the IJV participants 
(Inkpen et al., 2007, 2).  Such a joint-venture can be either national or international and can 
involve friendly or competing participants.  Some existing motivations for competitors to 
cooperate are:  gaining access to a domestic market, sharing risks and costs and creating 
economies of scale, etc.   
This paper focuses on how the optimal conditions for a cooperative IJV between can be 
reconsidered.  The argument of this thesis demonstrates an approach by which competing 
technological companies can cooperate in order to become more competitive, even as they 
continue to compete against one another as individual companies.  Specifically, this paper reveals 
that it is advantageous for two competing technology companies to cooperate when their collaboration 
promises to result in a breakthrough technology or advancement for an emerging market.  The result is a 
suggestion of how a motivating factor can push competing companies to work together 
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successfully.  This paper uses both primary resources from the case study participants’ websites, 
as well as archival sources from business publications and news journals. 
In chapter 2, a review of literature focusing on cooperation and international joint 
ventures (IJVs) between competing technology companies is discussed.  Above all, both the 
traditional motivations for the formation of an IJV and the challenges of creating a successful 
IJV between competing participants are shown.   
Chapter 3 details the characteristics of the Ashkelon case, the construction of the largest 
desalinating water plant in the world.  In particular, the competing company participants of the 
Ashkelon case (IDE and Veolia) and the components of their IJV are discussed.  In addition, the 
effects and possible complications of the Ashkelon IJV for IDE and Veolia are considered. 
Chapter 4 considers the existing theories on cooperating competitors from chapter 2’s 
literature review and uses the theories in an analysis against the Ashkelon case.  In the end, the 
pre-existing IJV theories prove to be insufficient when considered against the Ashkelon case.  
Consequently, an approach of cooperating for the future is suggested as a possible motivating 
factor for the Ashkelon IJV’s ability to become a success despite challenging factors which could 
have impeded the IJV endeavor.  In addition, the possible rewards for competitors who choose to 
cooperate for the future are highlighted.  Lastly, an option for further research is considered.   
Finally, chapter 5 provides applicable small- and large-scale recommendations for 
company managers who are considering the formation of an IJV with a competing technological 
company and who would like to understand how to recognize and utilize the approach of 
cooperating for the future within their companies.   
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2. Literature Review of Cooperation between Technological Competitors 
 “Technological innovation [is] the means by which the ability to compete is sustained – 
the investment that ensures that a company will still be in business in five years’ time.  It is the 
most important fixed cost that the modern multinational must support” (Collins et al., 1991, 8).  
In addition to the necessity for companies to progress technologically, Jeffrey Dyer and Harbir 
Singh reason that the advantages of a company are often connected to the advantages of that 
company’s alliances (Dyer, 1998).  Today, cooperation in an IJV offers a means for a company 
to both increase their network and enhance their technological abilities, but when competing 
technology companies form an alliance a delicate balance between cooperation and competition 
ensues.   
Several motivations for why competing companies may desire to form a cooperative IJV 
with one another exist.  Gary Hamel calls this kind of alliance a ‘competitive collaboration’ and 
contends that the root incentive of forming such an IJV is for the participants to gain skills and/or 
learn from one another via the IJV connection (Hamel, 1991, 87).  As a result, cooperating 
competitors could be better able to progress in their technological innovations by learning from 
one another in an IJV. 
However, cooperating and sharing technological know-how with potential competitors 
can lead to exploitation and other costly disasters.  Tarun Khanna, Ranjay Gulati and Nitin 
Nohria argue that “firms often fail to recognize the existence or the magnitude of the asymmetric 
incentives to invest that inevitably arise as an alliance evolves.  The differential incentives to 
invest are a result of the competitive aspects of what is simultaneously a cooperative and a 
competitive enterprise” (Khanna, et al., 1998).  Thus, the inherent duality of an IJV that consists 
of competitors has the potential to assist the participants in learning and progressing in 
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technological innovations, but also harbors the risk that the IJV participants will have 
asymmetric incentives which could lead to exploitive and other risk factors via the IJV.   
This thesis is concerned with when it could be advantageous for two competing 
technology companies to participate with one another in an international joint venture (IJV), 
despite the potential risks involved with such a venture.   
2.1. Existing Challenges to Forming Successful IJVs between Competitors 
 Despite the growth of IJV formations, prominent theories exist which suggest that 
caution in IJV formations between competing technology companies is necessary.  The best 
known reasons against competitors cooperating within the technology industry are the race to 
learn and knowledge leaks. 
 Some theorists maintain that an alliance between two competing technological companies 
creates the possibility for a race to learn, where each competing company tries to gain knowledge 
from the other first (Gary, 1991, Vol. 12 88-103).  Two such theorists, Aimin Yan and Yadong 
Luo, state that, “particularly in technologically intensive industries, where there are large gains 
from innovation and steep losses from obsolescence, competition is best regarded as a learning 
race” (Luo et al., 2001, 113).  Consequently, these theorists maintain that the race to learn factor 
within technology is not conducive to cooperative joint ventures as the participants would always 
see one another as competitors rather than as partners. 
The possibility for a learning race to exist between cooperating technological companies 
might also lead to a knowledge leak, i.e. when a significant company intelligence and/or 
copyrighted contribution which company A provides to an IJV is appropriated by another 
participating company.  As a result, company A loses some or all of its bargaining leverage 
within the cooperative relationship (Yan et all, 1994, 1478-1517).  The underlying idea of 
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appropriated intelligence is that sensitive information, particularly technical know-how, could be 
leaked to a competitive joint-venture partner.  Consequently, because of the potential risk of 
intellectual appropriation, technology companies are wary of entering into joint-ventures with 
their technological competitors – despite the notion that sharing technology can hold the key for 
a company’s future prospects.   
An additional challenge for competitors forming an IJV is the potential to lose talent.  
This happens when a capable employee from one IJV participant leaves to work for another 
company participant of the same IJV, either because of mismanagement and/or superior hiring 
incentives.  Dean Tjosvold and Kwok Leung contend that losing talent is one of the most 
significant reasons for IJV failures (Tjosvold, 2003, 131).  For this reason, companies can be 
hesitant to participate in an IJV with a competitor for fear of losing talented employees. 
Despite the challenges in creating and maintaining an IJV, in today’s world of fast paced 
globalization and technological growth, the combination of creating major technological projects 
to gain access to nascent markets could be a sufficient motivation for the formation of a 
successful IJV between two technological competitors.  
2.2. Known Motivations to Forming an IJV between Competitors 
Although the above theories against cooperation between technological competitors are 
still prominent today, several theories which are motivators for cooperation between 
technological competitors have also gained recognition and support within technological 
industries.  The following theoretical arguments suggest that a possible technological 
‘competitor’ could also be a potential ‘partner.’ They argue that, despite the possibility of a race 
to learn, technology can still be a source of collaboration, even if the two companies openly 
compete with one another outside of the IJV during or after their cooperative effort.   
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To begin with, Bernard Garrette and Pierre Dussauge agree that cooperation can occur, 
but argue that even if two competing companies choose to cooperate that competition could still 
continue to exist between them (Dussauge et al., 1995, 429-452).  However, although Garrette 
and Dussauge suggest that a cooperative joint venture between competing technological 
companies is possible, they do not provide possible motivations for why such an IJV should form 
despite the risks involved. 
One such motivation for technological competitors to cooperate within an IJV is to gain 
access to a domestic market.  When making this argument, Inkpen and Beamish contend that, “as 
competition increasingly becomes more global, many firms are using alliances to enter new 
markets…” (Inkpen et al., 2007, 2).  For this reason, some theorists reason that competition is 
becoming a global game where alliances can help maneuver new domestic markets. 
Another factor in favor of cooperation between technological competitors is the 
opportunity for a technological joint venture to minimize uncertainty, as can be seen in Yan and 
Luo’s argument that “new technology is both a stimulus to and a focus of cooperative effort that 
seeks to reduce the inherent uncertainty associated with novel products or markets” (Luo et all., 
2001,113).  Thus, because of the unpredictability of new products and markets, having a partner 
– who as a competitor is similar in nature – could help to circumvent and solve unforeseen 
problems the technological IJV may face. 
In addition to avoiding uncertainty, competing companies could also cooperate in a joint 
venture for the purpose of creating long-term company coalitions.  Arguing this point, Gary 
Hamel and C.K. Prahalad argue that today competition for the future of technology often takes 
place between company coalitions, sometimes even involving the creation of a new joint venture 
company (Hamel et al., 1994, Vol. 12 187).  Therefore, if a long-term collaboration between two 
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competing technology companies is possible, then such a venture could justify the formation of 
an IJV between competing companies. 
Furthermore, even without the creation of a separate company as part of a long-term 
venture, the potential for long-term gains alone could be a motivating factor for cooperation 
between two competing technological companies.  This can be seen, for example, in Contractor, 
Lorange and Farok’s reasoning that one of the most valuable reputations a company can earn is 
that of forbearance, when two companies choose to refrain from competing and decide to 
cooperate as a means to gaining more over the long-term (Contractor et al., 1988, 36).  For this 
reason, if long-term benefits exist, such as an enhanced team-player image, then cooperation 
between technological competitors could be recommended. 
Besides the long-term pay-off of an enhanced reputation, another reward which could 
justify cooperation between competitors is a sizeable financial profit for all participants.  This 
reward does not need to be long-term in order to be a viable incentive to cooperate.  Because of 
this, Contractor, Lorange and Farok contend that the success of an IJV is likely to be higher if the 
effect of the cooperative venture is strategically significant to all participants; particularly 
important is an equal financial distribution among the IJV participants of all profits earned 
(Contractor et al., 1988, 40).   
In addition to large and equally distributed financial rewards, Hamel and Prahalad agree 
that an IJV between technological competitors can be fueled “by the desire to make a difference 
in people’s lives – the bigger the difference, the deeper the commitment” (Hamel et al., 1994, 
Vol. 12 35).  In this light, some technological joint ventures could qualify as making a beneficial 
humanitarian difference in the world and could thereby deepen commitment among an IJV’s 
competing participants.   
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Beyond humanitarian incentives to create a technological IJV with competing 
participants, cooperation to gain economies of scale is an additional motivating prospect.  As 
Doz  and Hamel explain, IJVs can form “to obtain economies of scale and scope in marginal and 
well-known market segments” (Hamel, 1998, 6).  According to Hamel, economies of scale – cost 
benefits gained through growth – is one motivating factor which is considered to be a very safe 
reason for competing companies to cooperate. 
Another motivating factor for cooperation between competing technological companies is 
to collaborate on research and development (R&D).  Supporting this argument, Timothy Collins 
and Thomas Doorley state that “besides formal equity joint ventures, companies are getting 
together in less permanent ways to collaborate on R&D, teaming up to achieve major 
technological goals, and later splitting up to compete in specific applications” (Collins et al., 
1991, 3).  Because the competing companies would use the developed research as individual 
companies within their created applications, individual sensitive product know-how and 
applications can be safeguarded while cooperative research is achieved. 
Finally, the potential for a joint venture to strengthen weaknesses within the participating 
companies’ infrastructures could also be a positive impetus for competing technology companies 
to cooperate.  For this reason, Collins and Doorley argue that joint ventures “can help companies 
with technology to acquire adequate manufacturing or marketing skills; they can help companies 
to combine technologies to enter new applications markets; and they can help companies with 
little or no relevant technology diversify into new markets.  In some cases, the venture is a 
carefully planned move to change the core business portfolio; in others, it is an opportunistic 
move to exploit a technological competence that would otherwise lie fallow” (Collins et al., 
1991, 206).  Consequently, a joint venture could be an opportunity for competing companies, 
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who are weak as individual companies within the global market, to strengthen themselves 
through cooperation. 
Consequently, a number of motivations exist which encourage a cooperative IJV between 
technological competitors.  However, the case study highlighted in this thesis represents an 
example of an IJV between competing technology companies, where the motivating factor is not 
one of the before mentioned motivating theories in favor of cooperation.  For this reason, an 
additional consideration for competing technological companies can be suggested and analyzed.    
2.3. Common Solutions to Strengthen IJVs 
Because having some challenging factors when forming an IJV is likely, some protective 
solutions can be used to help create and sustain a successful IJV. One such solution is the 
establishment of trust between the IJV participants.  However, within IJV formations, trust does 
not require affinity; for this reason, Richard Mead and Tim Andrews explain to IJV company 
participants that “[trust] does not necessarily involve emotional commitment – you may not even 
like them [the other IJV participant]” (Mead, 2009, 297).  Instead, an agreement of trust means 
that the participants understand one another’s needs and interests and are able to anticipate one 
another’s behavior.  A trust between IJV participants might include an agreement on the details 
of the IJV’s plan, the IJV contract, the IJV stages of development, the management protocol, the 
methods of communication and criteria for evaluating the IJV’s growth and success (Mead, 
2009, 297).  Consequently, an agreement of trust can be a helpful solution in circumventing 
some challenges during the IJV formation and operation. 
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Another example of a protective measure against possible IJV challenges is the creation 
of a covenant.  As Jerry Cohen and Alan Gutterman explain, a covenant between IJV participants 
(who were or are still competitors outside of the IJV) can create a strict agreement against 
competing during the IJV (Cohen, 1998, 166).  If an IJV participant should break the covenant, 
such as by exploiting copyrighted information, then that company could face pre-determined 
repercussions.    
All in all, strategic agreements of trust concerning the operation of an IJV or covenants 
against competitive rule breaking are protective measures which can be used to help prevent 
some of the challenges that IJVs can face. 
2.4. Cooperating for the Future   
Competing technology companies can participate in an IJV to create a technological 
milestone and be able to enter an emerging global market, thereby enhancing their reputation as 
technological leaders and gaining more contracts and money outside of the initial IJV.   
A case study of the world’s largest desalination plant in Ashkelon, Israel and its analysis 
against IJV theory demonstrates that when two competing technological companies choose to 
cooperate for the achievement of a technological breakthrough within an emerging industry, by 
doing so the participating competitors will benefit in two ways.  First, the companies will be able 
to develop a technological milestone.  Even though the companies in the Ashkelon project each 
had the capability to develop an advanced desalination plant technology independently, the 
competing companies chose to collaborate.  Secondly, and as a result of the first benefit, 
voluntary participation within an IJV for the sake of technology, a shared vision and teamwork, 
the cooperative relationship will provide both competing companies with a reputation as 
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international team players and technological leaders within their industry – helping both to gain 
future contracts and larger profits.   
Overall, these benefits mean that competing technology companies could collaborate in 
an IJV to become more competitive later.  In other words, they can actively compete by 
cooperating for the future.   
2.4. Conclusion 
Today an IJV between competing technology companies could provide a means to 
achieve technological milestones.  For this reason, technological competitors who want to remain 
competitive, particularly within a world where technological breakthroughs and advancements 
are continuously expected, could benefit from cooperating in an IJV with a competitor.  Yet, 
before a theoretical analysis of cooperating for the future can be done, the following chapter 
describes the Ashkelon IJV case study; specifically, the Ashkelon project’s competing 
participants, its advanced technology and market impact are detailed. 
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3. The Ashkelon Case 
 The sea water desalination plant in Ashkelon, Israel is the first of its kind in size and 
technology.  The plant, created by the international joint venture OTID (formed equally by OTV 
Veolia Group and IDE Technologies), was the world’s first large-scale desalination plant and 
was completed in 2005 (www.water-technology.net).  The plant purifies 110 million cubic 
meters of water per year at one of the world’s lowest desalinated water prices of .52 cents per 
cubic meter.  It is estimated that the plant meets 5-6% of Israel’s national water demand 
(www.water-technolgy.net).  Overall, the Ashkelon desalination plant has transformed the water 
needs of Israel and has become both a stepping stone and a symbol for the future of water 
technology and the water purifying market.   
This chapter briefly reviews the significance of the global water market.  The roles of the 
companies IDE and Veolia, both of which cooperated in the OTID joint venture to create the 
Ashkelon plant, are also highlighted.  Finally, the Ashkelon desalination plant is discussed, as 
well as the effects of the plant and possible complications it might face in the future.   
3.1. The Fresh Water Market 
 Before a description of OTID and its participating companies can be given, the water 
market’s economic prospects and consumer demands should be discussed.  All in all, the fresh 
(i.e. potable) water industry is only emerging and, until recently, has not been dominated by any 
one company (Dickie, 2007). 
Although still young in development, the economic significance of the market for fresh 
water is growing exponentially.  “In the business world, water is a hot new commodity and that 
heat is generating more than steam: it is a $400 billion industry growing at about 6 percent per 
year. But, besides the financial opportunities, water technology is clearly an attractive market for 
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other more important reasons. New technology promises to quench the world's thirst and to 
provide environmentally sound solutions to reducing water shortage and water contamination” 
(Kloosterman, 2008).  The fresh water market is an ever increasing success because currently 
only about 2% of the Earth’s water resources consist of fresh water, and even the presence of this 
small percentage faces threats from both drought and pollution (Solutions in Water).  
Consequently, the future of the fresh water market is promising.   
 Yet the potential economic benefit within the water market is not the only factor 
associated with the growing demand for fresh water.  Water shortages could result in a 
humanitarian crisis.  Perhaps the most obvious side effect of inadequate water resources is 
dehydration and death.  Today, it is estimated that about 2 billion people worldwide do not have 
access to enough drinkable water and are suffering as a consequence (Mayer, 2007).  A large 
range of social and health issues can be caused by water shortages.  Moreover, within the Middle 
East region many experts believe that conflict over vital water resources, to be used as drinkable 
water, will cause a full-scale war in the future (Leyne, 2004).  For this reason, the fresh water 
market is not only projected to expand because of increasing global water shortages, but also 
because of pure human need and international demand from governments seeking to avoid other 
countries’ use of water as a political weapon.  
However, one of the most anticipated technologies for solving the dilemma of inadequate 
drinking water is water desalination.  Desalination of water is the removal of salt and other 
substances to create drinkable water (Dickie, 2007).  Until recently, desalination was viewed as a 
‘Rolls-Royce solution’ of last resort, too costly to be a practical fix to the Earth’s water shortage 
crisis (Leyne, 2004).  However, because the plant in Ashkelon used the most advanced 
desalinating technologies available, its desalination technology is proving to be a worthwhile and 
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even cost effective tool for creating fresh water.  To date, only 1% of all water consumed is 
produced by desalination; yet 25% of the world’s population resides within less than 25 km from 
a seacoast from which water for desalination could be easily retrieved (Eye on World Largest 
reverse osmosis seawater desalination plant in Israel, 2006).  As a result, the use of desalinating 
technology by a significant percentage of the world’s population could dramatically lessen water 
shortages and their global and humanitarian effects.  The success of Ashkelon’s desalinating 
plant has thus rendered the technology of OTID a breakthrough within the fresh water market. 
On the whole, the world’s market for drinkable water is still immature.  The economic 
potential for drinkable water is predicted to continue growing as water resources become 
increasingly depleted.  In addition, development of the water market industry holds the possible 
promise of being able to positively affect humanitarian needs.  To be sure, because of the 
Ashkelon project, both IDE and Veolia are becoming company leaders within the developing 
water industry of desalination technology. 
3.2. The Ashkelon Project 
 The cooperative international joint-venture between the competing companies IDE and 
Veolia allowed for the completion of the world’s largest water desalination plant in Ashkelon, 
Israel.  The following information provides greater detail concerning the Ashkelon project’s 
participants, the nature of their IJV contract, as well as the advanced technology which the 
Ashkelon IJV employs. 
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Figure 1 General View of Ashkelon Desalination Plant (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006). 
3.2.1. The IJV Participants 
Two leading companies equally participated (50-50%) within the OTID joint venture for 
the construction of the Ashkelon desalination plant project, they are IDE Technologies Itd. 
(Israeli) and OTV – Vivendi Group (French) (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006).   It is important to 
mention that the Israeli investment company, Dankner-Ellern Infrastructure, participated in a 
separate IJV to finance the Ashkelon project (called VID), but the Dankner-Ellern company did 
not participate in the construction IJV to build the Ashkelon plant (called OTID), which is the 
primary focus of this case study (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006).   
Before undertaking the construction joint-venture OTID in Ashkelon, both IDE and 
Veolia shared many similarities, but were also competitors within the water desalinating market.  
Before Ashkelon, IDE was a leader in the production and supply of fresh water worldwide, with 
about 300 employees and a focus on customized designing and manufacturing of state-of-the-art 
water treatment technologies (The IDE Vision, 2008).  “Since its inception in 1965, IDE has 
designed and supplied over 360 plants of various types and sizes in nearly 40 countries 
worldwide, with an overall production capacity of about 1,280,000 m3/day” (Key Customers & 
Technology, 2008).  In comparison, OTV - Vivendi has more than 2,000 employees and is also a 
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world leader in tailored solutions for environmental services (Veolia Environment, 2008).  
However, while IDE focuses on only water desalination technologies, Veolia also specializes in 
water management, waste management, energy management, and passenger transportation” 
(Veolia Environment, 2008).   
Overall, before the Ashkelon project both companies were equally-sized competitors in 
the fresh water market and both continued to be competitors during the Ashkelon contract and 
after the contract’s completion.  This can be seen in that both companies have not worked 
together on additional contracts since the Ashkelon project; yet, both companies vie for the same 
international project calls for tenders.  
3.2.2. The VID and OTID Contracts 
 In July 2000, Israel called for international tenders to apply for the opportunity of 
creating the world’s largest seawater reverse osmosis (SWRO) desalinating plant in Ashkelon, a 
city in Israel’s arid Negev desert (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006). 
The Ashkelon project was divided into two separate contracts.  The financing, operation 
and maintenance aspects of the Ashkelon project were covered in an IJV contract which was 
awarded in September 2001 and signed in November 2001 by a consortium of individual 
companies, including Veolia – Vivendi Group, IDE Technologies Itd. and the Israeli investment 
company Dankner Ellern Infrastructure.  The financing and maintenance IJV created by this 
consortium was named VID and responsibility within the VID joint venture was separated into 
25% Veolia, 25% Ellern and 50% IDE.  However, an additional contract for the engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) of the Ashkelon Project was signed in the same month with 
IDE and OTV – Vivendi Group; this EPC joint-venture was named OTID and was separated into 
50% Veolia and 50% IDE.  The OTID contract was completed in 2005 upon the completion of 
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the Ashkelon plant’s construction (Sauvet-Coichon, 2006).  However, the VID contract, which 
consists also of the OTID members plus one investment firm, operates on a build operate transfer 
basis (BOT), where after 25 years responsibility for the Ashkelon project as well as 100% of 
profits generated will transfer to the Israeli government’s National Water Company, Mekorot 
(Ashkelon Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).  The 
initial contracts signed called for an annual production of only 50 million cubic meters per year, 
but a second agreement was signed in April 2002 doubling the required annual production 
capacity.  As a result, with a fresh water production of 100 million cubic meters per year (or 
320,000 cubic meters per day), the Ashkelon desalination plant would become the first large-
scale, as well as the largest ever created, seawater plant of its kind (Ashkelon Desalination Plant, 
Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).   
Within Israel, 100 cubic meters of fresh water per year is equal to about one seventh of 
Israel’s water demand, not including agriculture and industry needs (Leyne, 2004).  In a different 
light, 108 million cubic meters per year is the fresh water consumption of about 1.4 million 
people (Veolia Water starts up operation of the world’s largest reverse osmosis seawater 
desalination plant in Ashkelon (Israel), 2005).  The total cost of the Ashkelon desalination plant 
was approximately US $250 million and was created by a mixture of 23% equity and 77% debt.  
By 2030, the total expected revenue over the 25 year contract period will be about US $825 
million (Ashkelon Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).  
Overall, the price of Ashkelon’s desalinated water is about US $0.52 per cubic meter, which is 
only slightly higher than the pre-existing water costs in Israel at around US $0.45 per cubic 
meter (Leyne, 2004). Yet, the water from Ashkelon is of a higher quality and opportunities and 
technologies with which costs may be lowered are experimented with continually (Leyne, 2004).  
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After the Ashkelon plant’s completion in 2005, the plant began providing “one of the world’s 
lowest ever prices for desalinated water” (Ashkelon Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse 
Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007). 
Consequently, due to Ashkelon’s size and novel technologies employed, the Global 
Water Awards named it the ‘Desalination Plant of the Year’ in 2006 (Ashkelon Desalination 
Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).  A close look at the technologies 
involved within the plant reveal how the project was able to achieve its success, as well as the 
project’s technological advancement within the water desalinating industry. 
3.2.3. Advanced Technologies  
 The combined creative efforts of IDE and Veolia within the international joint-venture 
OTID allowed for the implementation of novel ideas and new technologies to create a low-cost 
fresh water product and an efficient, award-winning desalination plant.  The following points 
address the key innovations which made the Ashkelon plant into an award winning advancement 
within the fresh water market.  For a general understanding of the Ashkelon plant’s workings, 
readers should refer to Figure 1’s diagram below, entitled “How Reverse Osmosis Desalination 
Works.” 
First, the Ashkelon plant consists of two separate, autonomous plants (the North and 
South plants) built on the same 70,000 square meter construction site (IDE Technologies 
launches, 2008).  Each individual plant contributes 50 million cubic meters of fresh water per 
year, or half of Ashkelon’s total amount produced annually (Veolia Water starts up operation of 
the world’s largest reverse osmosis seawater desalination plant in Ashkelon).  In addition, “with 
the exception of the seawater intake, the product water treatment system and the dedicated power 
plant, the site sub-systems have been duplicated to ensure independence of operation” (Ashkelon 
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Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).  Because the plants 
work independently from one another, back-up measures and separate maintenance servicing can 
be performed while the overall plant can continue to be online and functioning; production is 
also more efficient and cost effective with the use of two separate plants (Ashkelon Desalination 
Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).   
Secondly, the three-center design model created specifically for this plant allows the 
pressure pumps, energy recovery devices and membrane banks to operate independently and 
more flexibly.  Specifically, “separating the high-pressure pump from the energy recovery device 
and breaking the link between pump capacity and the [Reverse Osmosis] bank capacity… brings 
significant technological flexibility and high efficiency to the system while also reducing overall 
water cost” (Ashkelon Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 
2007).   
Third, OTID’s advancements in the membrane technologies used at Ashkelon further 
reduced the cost of desalination (Solution in Water, 2008).  In particular, the membrane 
technology uses a unique Boron removal system which is highly flexible and adjustable to water 
temperature fluctuations; moreover, the system is capable of removing more than 92% the sea 
water’s impurities (Ashkelon Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, 
Israel, 2007).   
Fourth, in addition to being able to retrieve energy from outside of the plant’s site, a 
novel addition to Ashkelon was that of a dedicated gas turbine power station on site which has 
been “a major factor in both safeguarding operational reliability and reducing energy costs” 
(Ashkelon Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).  
Ashkelon’s independent power plant has a capacity of about 80 MW and prevents the plant from 
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relying solely on outside power sources, allowing the plant to perform more reliably and 
efficiently (IDE Technology launches, 2008).   
Finally, OTID designed an innovative Energy Recovery System (ERS) as a state-of-the-
art means of saving energy (IDE Technology launches, 2008).  The ERS recycles around 85-90% 
of the energy used for extracting brine, which ultimately saves money and further reduces the 
cost of Ashkelon’s desalinated water (Davis, 2005).   
Overall, these creative solutions – in combination with one another – work together to 
more efficiently create a higher quality fresh water product that is less expensive to produce; 
these innovations “make the difference between producing water at 80 cents a cubic meter and 
achieving a price of 52.7 cents per cubic meter” (Davis, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 2  How Reverse Osmosis Desalination Works (Leyne, 2004).  This diagram shows the basic process of 
the reverse osmosis desalination which the Ashkelon plant uses. 
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3.3. The Effects of Ashkelon 
The Ashkelon plant, created by the OTID international joint venture, uses several 
technological advancements within its design and water purification process.  These 
advancements have had significant positive effects, as well as some potential negative 
consequences, for the Ashkelon plant – as well as for its joint creators IDE and Veolia.    
3.3.1. Enhanced Reputation 
 As noted earlier, the Ashkelon plant was named the ‘Desalination Plant of the Year’ in 
2006, just one year after the plant went online.  The advanced technologies within the Ashkelon 
plant, as well as the innovative teamwork that both IDE and Veolia performed, made the plant 
and its participating companies famous worldwide within the fresh water market. 
 Concerning IDE, it was said that the Ashkelon plant was “the latest milestone in IDE’s 
impressive track record of achievements, further solidifying its position as the global leader in 
seawater desalination mega-sized projects” (IDE Technology launches, 2008).  Because of the 
company’s enhanced reputation within the fresh water industry, IDE has signed contracts to 
create more desalination plants in other countries, including Australia and China (IDE to Build 
Desalination Plant in Asia, 2008).  Similarly, Veolia’s image has become that of a world leader 
within the fresh water market since its work on Ashkelon and subsequent contracts (Veolia 
Water wins important seawater desalination contract, thus confirming its international expertise 
in desalination, 2008).  In particular, Veolia has won desalination plant contracts in Queensland, 
Australia’s Gold Coast and Sur in Oman (Veolia Water wins important seawater desalination 
contract, thus confirming its international expertise in desalination, 2008). 
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In summary, both IDE and Veolia have individually enhanced their reputations as a result 
of their advanced technologies and cooperative work within the OTID joint venture.  Because of 
the image as world leaders within the desalination industry which both companies gained from 
their work on the Ashkelon project, both IDE and Veolia have gone on as individual companies 
to win further desalinating plant contracts within the fresh water market. 
3.3.2. Future Complications 
Although the Ashkelon project had a positive effect on IDE and Veolia’s reputations and 
futures as individual companies, potential negative factors have also risen since the desalinating 
plant’s completion in 2005.  The following variables might present future complications for the 
Ashkelon plant and its participating companies within the continuing VID joint-venture (even 
though OTID’s venture ended upon completion of the plant project, the reputation of OTID’s 
participants could still become diminished).   
 To begin with, there is some concern by scientists within the fresh water industry that 
increasingly polluted sea waters would increase desalination costs for desalination plants due to 
the need to service the filter technology more frequently (Water Week EWN Publishing, 2007).  
Yet, so far Ashkelon’s unique boron filter system has allayed any fears that pollution will 
dramatically, if at all, affect the plant’s desalination costs.  In addition to concerns about 
pollution, because the plant’s site in Ashkelon is only 11 km from Gaza, the plant has been in the 
range of rocket and artillery fire on several occasions (Water Week EWN Publishing, 2007).    
Nevertheless, the plant in Ashkelon has avoided collateral damage until now.  Furthermore, 
should the plant sustain damage in the future from conflicts in the region, the plant itself consists 
of two separately working plants so that reparative service can be completed while water is still 
desalinating at half capacity.   Also, having an independent power source on the plant’s site, in 
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addition to also having power available from outside of the plant site, is a useful precaution 
against the damages of war.  Lastly, and perhaps most controversially, a possible concern in the 
future is that “although cost and energy consumption to operate desalination plants are being 
reduced, experts say that marine environments could be seriously affected by chemicals used in 
the water production process, with copper accumulation the most impactive” (Hunter, 2009).  
This final factor could prove to be the most damaging to the Ashkelon plant because it could 
affect the image of the plant’s advanced technology, as well as the technological images of IDE 
and Veolia. 
In brief, the Ashkelon plant could face several negative variables both now and in the 
future, including:  pollution within the sea water collected, conflict within the region and, finally, 
the prospect that Ashkelon’s work might be negatively impacting the environment rather than 
being a scientific improvement upon it.  Nevertheless, none of these factors have fully 
materialized or have proven to be detrimental to Ashkelon’s success thus far. 
3.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the plant in Ashkelon, Israel is the largest and most efficient desalination 
plant in the world.  Its cooperative construction by the OTID joint venture, which equally 
included both IDE and Veolia, allowed for the creation of innovative and advanced technologies.  
The final product is a desalination plant that has set a very high precedent and has gained a 
leading reputation within the world’s fresh water market.  The next chapter analyzes the 
traditional IJV theories against the Ashkelon case and presents the argument of cooperating for 
the future.   
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4. Cooperating for the Future:  An Analysis of the Ashkelon Case  
This chapter compares the Ashkelon case (from chapter 3) against the most significant 
existing IJV theories, which are used to determine the ideal conditions necessary for an IJV to 
succeed.  Whereas chapter 2 reviewed the existing theories on cooperating competitors, this 
chapter uses the theories in a comparison against the Ashkelon case to highlight the motivation 
of cooperating for the future.  Overall, the analysis of the Ashkelon case against previously 
existing theories (both specifically related to cooperating technological competitors as well as 
general IJV theories) results in the suggestion of a contingency approach; namely, cooperating 
for the future, which provides an additional motivation for successful IJV formation between 
technological competitors.   
4.1. Traditional IJV Theories and the Ashkelon Case 
In addition to the learning race, there are potential challenges when competitors create an 
IJV.  Although these theories show the motivations and challenges for the formation of 
international joint-ventures which can be helpful for most companies that are questioning 
whether or not to cooperate with their competitor, in the Ashkelon case these theories prove to be 
insufficient.  Normally, before any IJV is formed these traditional theories are consulted to 
discern whether or not the motivations in favor of formation outweigh the potential challenges.  
These calculations are different for every joint-venture situation, depending on the variables 
involved.   
It is important to emphasize that even though the Ashkelon case seems to negate these 
theories, the theories are still accurate and helpful in the majority of IJV formations.  In addition, 
this qualifying list of pro and con factors is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to show the 
most common variables which are weighed before forming an IJV.  Finally, although the 
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Ashkelon plant was created by the OTID international joint venture, which consisted of an equal 
50-50% partnership between the competing companies IDE and Veolia, for the sake of simplicity 
the rest of the thesis will address Ashkelon’s IJV as VID and not OTID.  This is because VID, 
which consists of the same OTID members plus an investment company, is concerned with the 
maintenance and continuity of the Ashkelon plant during the life of its contract, while OTID was 
only created for the construction of the desalination plant. 
4.1.1. Challenges of Forming an IJV  
There are several traditional theories which highlight the negatives factors when creating 
an IJV.  The following factors normally weigh heavily against joint venture formation.  When 
considered in the Ashkelon case though, these theories are insufficient.   
To begin with, failure rate is a factor against the formation of IJVs.  Collins reasons that 
equity joint ventures in particular are inherently unstable and that the anticipated benefits of 
cooperation all too often turn out to be elusive (Collins et all., 1991, 202).  For example, the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) records that in 1995 19,617 mergers and acquisitions took 
place, and Collins contends that two-thirds to four-fifths of those joint venture projects were 
considered strategic failures” (Triantis, 1999).  The prospect of a larger market or profit gain can 
help sustain an IJV against inherent instabilities which come with cooperating endeavors.  
However, the Ashkelon plant was created by a temporary international joint venture, VID, which 
will need to transfer ownership of the Ashkelon plant to the state of Israel after a period of 25 
years (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006).  Because Ashkelon’s IJV is for only a temporary contractual 
period, the result is a decreased margin of time in which VID can earn profits.  Since the long-
term viability of VID and its potential profits are limited, it is even more remarkable that the 
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project has thus far been successful in circumventing the high risks associated with many other 
IJVs.   
 Another variable against the formation of an IJV is the cultural and country-level 
differences that can exist between cooperating companies (Hofstede, 2003). These differences 
can affect an IJV’s ability to communicate and understand both participants and may possibly 
cause instability and failure for the IJV in the future, as Collins suggests above.  In the Ashkelon 
case, VID consists of both French and Israeli employees.  Both French and Israeli nationalities 
are often stereotyped as fiercely nationalistic.  Furthermore, within the last fifty years both 
nations have been on the opposing sides of international conflicts involving the Middle Eastern 
region (Fishman, 2006).  These are both cultural differences which could have had an adverse 
affect on the Ashkelon IJVs.  In addition, country-level differences exist between France and 
Israel, such as language differences (French vs. Hebrew), religious differences (Christianity vs. 
Judaism) and, finally, regional differences (European Union vs. Middle Eastern region).  The list 
of cultural and country-level differences between French and Israelis is surely much longer than 
just these aspects and consists of many more variables than these few alone.  For this reason, 
when all the cultural and country-level differences are considered together, particularly the 
existence of past international conflicts between the two nationalities, it could be considered a 
paradox that a French and Israeli IJV would be successful. 
  Bureaucracy can also be a hazard for IJV formations (Kaufmann et al., 2005).  If the 
government of a participating company is corrupt or with a great deal of red tape, then the 
formation of an IJV may be more difficult to implement and the risks much greater.  Both France 
and Israel have histories of high corruption within their governments and businesses (Fishman, 
2006).  Although one could argue that corruption is a shared cultural variable which both sides 
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might understand within each other, corruption is a factor that, even when shared by both parties, 
ultimately inhibits progress and cooperative initiatives.   
 Finally, as discussed in chapter two, a race to learn and knowledge leaks are also 
potential drawbacks of an IJV formation.  Today, with increasing technological advancements 
and technology infringements, this final reason against an IJV formation continues to become 
more critical.  As American companies learned when the microchip, an American innovation, 
began to be produced even better by outsourced parties, when technology is concerned it is 
absolutely crucial that company know-how remain a secret (Johnstone, 1999).  This secrecy is 
not only to ensure a stable IJV, but also to individually protect the participating companies from 
losing their technological advantages in products or services.  However, despite that VID’s 
Ashkelon desalination plant is the first of its kind in terms of technology and size and also 
despite that many know-how secrets were necessary in its construction, the Ashkelon case has 
not experienced a race to learn or a knowledge leak between its joint venture partners.  However, 
in 2007 (two years after the Ashkelon plant began operating) IDE’s Vice President and manager, 
Gustavo Kronenberg, left IDE Technologies to head the competing desalination company Tahal 
Group (Kronenberg broadens his portfolio with Tahal).  Although Kronenberg’s decision 
qualifies as a potential knowledge leak and lost talent, it is significant to emphasize that this 
challenging factor for the Ashkelon IJV occurred outside of the IJV participants.   
 In addition to all the above negative variables, some argue that even the act of trying to 
overcome these negative factors to create an IJV would result in exorbitant costs which would be 
a negative in itself (Inkpen et al., 2007, 6).  Overall, these theoretical reasons against the 
formation of an IJV all condemn the Ashkelon joint-venture and are also all confounded by 
VID’s continued success.  By their reasoning, the Ashkelon project should not have been 
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undertaken and, if created, it certainly should not have been successful.  Similarly, the following 
traditional motivations in favor of an IJV formation likewise prove unhelpful when dissecting the 
Ashkelon case. 
4.1.2. Motivations for an IJV Formation 
There are also many traditional theories which encourage the formation of IJVs.  The 
following factors normally weigh in favor of joint venture formation; however, they too prove to 
be unsuitable when considering Ashkelon’s IJV.   
One favorable reason for creating an IJV is the opportunity for one of the participating 
companies to gain access to a resource that another participating company has available within 
its local country (Contractor et al., 1988, 5).  This resource can be natural, such as oil, or could 
be something else, such as a cheap labor force.  Nevertheless, in the Ashkelon case VID was not 
formed to gain access to a local resource, but to create a renewable resource (water) for a local 
population.  Consequently, access to an existing resource was not an applicable motivation for 
VID’s formation. 
 The ability to enter a new domestic market is another possible advantage of an IJV (Luo 
et al., 2001, 8).  Accessing new markets can be crucial in order for a company to expand 
geographically and to enlarge its customer base (Collins et al., 1991, 201).  However, since VID 
has a contract life of only 25 years, this new market potential within Israel is limited.  
Consequently, the ability for VID to enter a new market (in this case Israel) and thereby extend 
its participating companies’ global customer base by gaining exponential growth within that 
local market is not possible since VID’s contract life is capped.  As a result, the possibility of 
entering a new market is a positive motivation for VID, but perhaps not as encouraging when 
compared to what a long-term IJV could benefit from when permanently entering a new market.  
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All in all, the limited time to gain from Israel’s market demand for drinkable water could not 
completely justify the Ashkelon IJV’s start-up expenses. 
 An additional motivation in favor of the creation of an IJV is the opportunity for partners 
to share risks and costs (Collins et al., 1999, 201).  When partners share the risks and costs to 
create an IJV there is more possibility for innovation and larger-scale endeavors can be 
undertaken.  Yet, IDE Technologies and OTV- Vivendi included an Israeli investment company 
Dankner Ellern Infrastructure to help carry the risk and costs associated with the VID joint 
venture.  Therefore, the partnership of IDE Technologies and OTV- Vivendi was not necessary 
to share risks and expenses.   
 Another motivating factor for the IJV formation is the advantage of having larger 
economies of scale (Contractor et al., 1988, 5).  The traditional rational for this is that “by 
sharing financial resources that otherwise are not available to each individual partner, two 
smaller companies in an industry can form a joint venture to achieve economies of scale similar 
to those that are enjoyed by their larger competitors” (Luo et al., 2001, 9).  However, VID was 
created by the partnering of two companies that were already large and had worked successfully 
as individual enterprises before joining the equity joint venture.  Furthermore, the basic principal 
of economies of scale is that the product will be able to be manufactured in a large enough 
quantity and as inexpensively as possible to maximize the profit margin of sales (Jackson, 1998).  
Yet, VID’s goal has been to produce filtered water as inexpensively as possible as well as to sell 
that drinkable water for a minimal profit.  This is because of Israel’s pre-contractual price 
guidelines with VID which required the price of US $0.52 (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006).  
Consequently, should Israel’s demand for drinkable water continue to rise, VID’s costs to 
produce as well as its price to sell the water are roughly fixed.  Therefore, in addition to the 
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contract time limit, the fixed contractual price also severely limits VID’s potential economy of 
scale.  
 Finally, the opportunity for IJV partners to create knowledge and obtain new skills by 
cooperating with one another is a positive reason for companies to form a joint venture (Inkpen 
et al., 2007, 7).  This advantage only works if both companies can learn from one another.  In 
particular, knowledge creation is only an IJV advantage if it can “accelerate entry into a new 
product market requiring skills that neither partner can provide alone” (Collins et al., 1999, 201).  
However, both IDE and Veolia market themselves as having been the dominant company within 
the VID joint venture.  Both companies were growing and were equally capable within the 
desalination field prior to the Ashkelon project.  Moreover, since Ashkelon both have 
individually created large-scale water desalination plants worldwide without the help of one 
another.  This phenomenon suggests that although obtaining new skills or knowledge might be a 
positive reason to form an IJV in general, for VID it was not a major incentive. 
 On the whole, if only the above theories in favor of IJVs were used as a guideline when 
judging whether or not to create VID, then VID in Ashkelon might not have been recommended 
as an advantageous IJV possibility.   
Overall, both the theoretical challenges and motivations of forming international joint 
ventures failed to adequately justify or even explain VID’s creation and success.  In summary, if 
the traditional theories for whether or not one should participate in a joint venture are insufficient 
in the Ashkelon case, then the question raised is what could have been the motivating factor (or 
factors) to create an accomplished joint venture in this case. 
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4.2. Cooperating for the Future  
Because the traditional challenges and motivations of the formation of IJVs between 
potential competitors do not relate to the Ashkelon case, VID provides a theoretical exception 
where cooperation between competitors in order to produce a novel technological achievement 
for an emerging market can provide both companies beneficial outcomes with long-term effects.   
4.2.1. Technological Advances and Emerging Market Access 
Because Ashkelon presents a unique IJV case, in which dominant joint venture theories 
prove to be insufficient, the existence of other driving incentives can be revealed.  The two 
strongest factors present in the Ashkelon case, but not in traditional IJV theory, are technological 
advancement and access to emerging technological markets.  Together, these factors represent 
the motivation of cooperating for the future. 
One possible reason for VID’s success was its completion of a major technological 
milestone. Even though IDE and Veolia were competitors before the Ashkelon project and 
continue to be competitors outside of the IJV today, by cooperating together in Israel they were 
able to be the first to complete a significant technological advancement.  The Ashkelon 
desalination plant’s technology is distinct in both the plant’s size and overall performance 
(including its water purifying capacity and price per liter) (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006).    
Consequently, VID’s performance shows that collaborative work – even among competing 
companies who do not fit the theoretically ideal IJV profile – could still be beneficial if it leads 
to the completion of first-time scientific advances and breakthroughs.  In the end, cooperation 
may not need to be based on sharing risks, costs or even knowledge, as have all been previously 
argued.   Instead, cooperation could be beneficial merely to bring together energy and shared 
ideas between equally leveraged partners in order to create a new technology.  Rather than 
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sharing risks, costs or finances, as was not the case with Ashkelon, cooperation could be based 
on sharing scientific progress. 
Another explanation for VID’s success may be a shared motivation between IDE and 
Veolia to capitalize on the emerging water desalination market.  Although the traditional IJV 
theories would have opposed the creation of VID, the Ashkelon case demonstrates that the 
possibility of redefining or creating a new technological market could provide sufficient 
incentive to form an IJV.  “Initial success goes to those companies that can recognize a new 
technological or market opportunity, and mobilize the R&D and marketing resources to take 
advantage of it” (Collins et al., 1999, 17-18).  Although it is not a new idea that gaining a new 
market opportunity is highly beneficial for a company to grow, in the case of Ashkelon the new 
market which is gained is not a population of people within a specific location who are in need of 
some service or product which other populations elsewhere already have.  Rather, the technology 
market that VID redefined is a worldwide industry which is still in its infancy.  Globally, the 
large-scale water desalination market had yet to be conquered.  As a result, VID’s cooperative 
joint venture has redefined the nascent water desalination market and has allowed VID and its 
participating companies, IDE and Veolia, to become dominant players within that market.  
Consequently, although earlier IJV theories might have opposed VID’s formation, the success of 
the Ashkelon project suggests that the ability for an IJV to develop an immature or non-existent 
technological global market might be a supportive factor in the IJV’s success. 
 In the end, both technological progress and access to an emerging technological market 
can be seen as strong incentives for VID to have formed, despite that the IJV would not qualify 
when analyzed against traditional IJV theories.  While cooperating for the future to develop a 
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new technology and to capitalize on an emerging market can explain the motivations for forming 
an IJV, it can also account for VID’s continued success. 
4.2.2. Rewards of Cooperating  
Cooperating for the future, working with competitors to create a technological 
advancement for an emerging market, can have several beneficial effects for all participating 
companies.  Similarly, because of their cooperative IJV, VID has experienced the following 
rewards. 
Perhaps the strongest effect of VID’s cooperation has been the global reputation that both 
IDE and Veolia have gained as individual companies through VID’s technological 
accomplishments.  Even though VID’s contract is not permanent, the reputation, as well as its 
rewards, which both IDE and Veolia have gained, could likely be long-term for both companies.  
Once the media reported the significance of the Ashkelon project, both IDE and Veolia’s 
reputations as individual companies became global and dominant within the water desalinating 
market.   Specifically, both companies have earned reputations as being forward thinking, team-
oriented and technological leaders (Contractor et al., 1988, 36).  In this light, IDE describes that 
its “mission is to be recognized as a world leader in the delivery of engineered water treatment 
solutions” (The IDE Vision, 2008).  Similarly, when discussing its future large-scale desalination 
plant with Saudi Arabia, Veolia states that they are leading specialists in the water desalination 
sector, who “are able to implement the latest state-of-the-art solutions and technologies” (Beolia 
Water is chosen to build one of the world’s largest desalination plants in the Saudi Arabia, 2007).  
As a result, for both IDE and Veolia, their reputations have increased the demand for future 
contracts around the world, including IDE’s contracts in Australia and China, as well as Veolia’s 
contracts in Australia and Oman (IDE to Build Desalination Plant in Asia, 2010).  Like a domino 
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effect, an enhanced company reputation has led to more contracts for IDE and Veolia and, 
naturally, more desalination contracts have also increased the overall profits of both companies.   
Another significant achievement IDE and Veolia have both been able to gain, by 
cooperating together in VID, has been the enhancement of their companies’ research and 
development.  Like any technology company today, it is crucial for both IDE and Veolia to 
invest in research and development (Collins et al., 1999, 8).  Since IDE and Veolia’s incomes are 
greater because of their growing worldwide reputation and consequent increase in contracts, both 
companies have more funds to invest towards research and development.  If both companies can 
remain at the forefront of future advancements in the water desalinating market, then their 
reputation’s beneficial cycle will continue into the future.  In other words, IDE and Veolia’s 
ability to invest in future research will earn them both an even greater profit.  
 As a result, because IDE and Veolia chose to cooperate for the future by creating a 
technological breakthrough to capitalize together in an emerging market, both companies have 
reaped several beneficial rewards from their decision.  In particular, IDE and Veolia have 
enhanced their reputations worldwide, allowing them to earn more contracts and they have also 
been able to use their increased capital from their new contracts to invest in further research and 
development – thereby generating more profit.  The bottom line is positive and one in which all 
companies pursue; namely, they have increased their incomes exponentially! 
4.2.3. Opposing Argument 
On might argue that cooperating for the future is comparable to the first mover advantage 
theory.  Similar to cooperating for the future, the first mover advantage relies on the idea of 
being the first company to make a move in an emerging market (Collins et al. 1999, 15).  In 
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addition, it is likely that the participants of VID have been better poised to dominate the 
desalination market because of their early entry, just as the first mover advantage would predict.   
However, it is important to highlight that in this paper the idea of cooperating for the 
future only involves new technology markets and not any other kind of market. Furthermore, the 
most important difference between the two theories is that the first-mover theory places 
companies in a race against one another to create a new product or service and then to be the first 
to enter the new market.  Yet, rather than racing against one another to be the first and dominant 
mover, in the Ashkelon case two competing companies chose to collaborate and share the glory 
that is commensurate in the development of a technology and entry into an emerging market.  In 
addition, beyond being seen as technological leaders in their respective market, IDE and Veolia’s 
cooperative relationship further enhanced their reputations as international team players willing 
to overcome differences to reach a goal.  This international team player image might prove 
particularly powerful in the 21st Century’s trend of humanitarian concerns, resource shortages 
and of globalization and its ever increasing demand for technology.  However, a company that 
operates under the first mover theory, which places one company in a race against all others, 
would not be able to tout such a global reputation.   
Overall, although early entry is a shared similarity between the first mover theory and the 
cooperating for the future approach, more important theoretical differences than similarities, 
such as teamwork over competition, exist between the two. 
4.3. A Similar Cooperative Occurrence  
In addition to analyzing the VID international joint-venture, today there are similar global 
alliances in technology with which VID can be compared.  One such conglomerate is the 
European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company N.V. (EADS), which is made up of 
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Germany’s DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG (DASA), France’s Aérospatiale-Matra and Spain’s 
Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA).  These three European companies merged in 2010 to 
develop aircraft (Airbus), space and other technological devices (www.eads.com).  Nevertheless, 
although EADS consists of international companies – who were former competitors – in order to 
produce technology, several differences between VID and EADS exist.  First, EADS creates 
products for existing markets rather than emerging ones, as with VID and the potable water 
market.  Second, EADS formed in order to better compete with more successful and established 
foreign companies, like Boeing; whereas VID formed to share the initial flag of leadership 
within the water market.  Third, EADS is a permanent international joint-venture, while VID’s 
contract in Israel expires after 25 years.  Fourth, the European Union is able to interfere and/or 
assist EADS with government subsidies and some theorists argue that without such subsidies 
EADS would not be able to compete with the prices of other international companies (Thompson 
2010).  Yet, VID does not receive government subsidies or assistance until the government 
becomes the full owner of the Ashkelon plant after 25 years time.  “[VID’s] agreement with the 
State is based on the BOT principle, whereby the entrepreneurs finance and construct the 
desalination plants on the State’s land which is made available to them. They operate the plant as 
a private business, and sell the water to the government of Israel at a pre-defined price, over a 
period of 25 years (including the construction period).  At the end of the contract period, the 
plant is handed over and becomes government property” (IDE lead consortium’s largest and 
most advanced seawater desalination facility of its kind began operation in Ashkelon). 
Finally, one could reason that because Germany, France and Spain are all countries 
within a larger governmental body, that of the European Union, the nature of the EADS joint-
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venture is not precisely one of differently minded and internationally competing companies, but 
rather a European-centric effort to consolidate and improve within the aeronautical industry. 
Overall, further research comparing technological IJVs consisting of competitors against 
the VID joint-venture could be very helpful in delineating whether creating a technological 
advancement is enough motivation to cooperate – without requiring an emerging market. 
 
4.4. Further Research 
In addition to the cooperating for the future’s components of creating a technological 
advancement and entering an emerging market, which could explain the success of the Ashkelon 
case where traditional theories have failed, other possible reasons might exist that were not 
covered in this paper, but which could have contributed to VID’s achievements.   
One such contributing factor could be the comparable size of VID’s participating 
companies.  Traditional theories usually highlight the importance of having one dominant 
company within an IJV (Collins, 1999, 15).  Yet, it is possible that the fact that IDE and Veolia 
were of comparable clout as individual companies may have aided the eventual success of VID.  
Suggesting this point, Dussauge, Pierre and Bernard reason that “the influence of the symmetry 
or asymmetry in size between allies upon the dynamics of alliances has been stressed in 
empirical studies…These studies suggest that alliances between similar firms tend to be more 
successful than asymmetric partnerships” (Dussauge, 1995, 55).  Although the importance of 
IJV’s consisting of similar-sized firms has only been suggested, further research would need to 
be done in order to identify whether shared-size is a sufficient factor when other traditional 
motivations are not present.  Nevertheless, the goal of this paper has been to show that 
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competing companies can successfully participate, even when traditional motivating theories are 
not applicable, given that the companies are pursuing technological breakthroughs for an 
emerging market.   
Because competing companies are usually of a comparable size, this factor was not 
considered.  However, it possible that VID would not have been successful had its participants 
been asymmetric in size.  Further research would need to be done in order to test this possibility.   
4.4. Conclusion 
Overall, the Ashkelon case shows that competing technology companies can collaborate 
in a short-term IJV to become more competitive later.  More specifically, IJVs can achieve 
success – even in the absence of traditional challenges and motivations – if they are producing a 
technological advancement for an emerging market.  In other words, if companies are willing to 
cooperate for the future their IJV can be successful.  As Hamel & Prahalad insightfully suggest, 
“competition for the future is competition for opportunity share rather than market share.  It is 
competition to maximize the share of future opportunities a company could potentially access 
within a broad opportunity arena…” (Hamel, 1994, Vol. 12 31).  In this light, cooperating for the 
future is the competition of the future.  The next chapter explains in greater detail how managers 
can recognize and apply the approach of cooperating for the future within their companies. 
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5. Management Recommendations 
 In chapter 4, a close analysis of the Ashkelon case against preexisting IJV theories 
revealed the approach of cooperating for the future.  Specifically, the idea of cooperating for the 
future is that two competing technology companies can successfully collaborate on a short-term 
IJV if the project involves the creation of a breakthrough technology for an emerging market.  
Yet, the question of how managers can recognize and implement ‘cooperation for the future’ 
within their companies remains.  This chapter may be used as a tool for company managers to 
help them address this issue.   
5.1. Recognizing Opportunities  
Technology companies that are considering the creation of an IJV with a competitor, but 
might not know how to recognize the opportunity to cooperate for the future, can address Table 1 
below.   
As shown in Table 1, if two competing companies would like to form a joint venture, 
then both companies should consider whether their IJV will create an advanced technology for 
an emerging market, will not create an advanced technology for an emerging market or will 
create an advanced technology for an emerging market, but with an IJV based on two 
asymmetric-sized companies.  After the intention of the IJV in question has been considered, the 
companies should research whether their planned venture falls within traditional theories of the 
challenges and motivations of forming a joint-venture.   
If two competing companies want to form an IJV based on the approach of cooperating 
for the future, then the companies should be similar in size (regardless of whether the IJV is 
equity-based) and they should be concerned with the creation of an advanced, breakthrough 
technology for an emerging market.  So long as the companies meet the before listed 
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requirements, they will receive a positive recommendation to proceed in their joint venture – 
regardless of whether or not their IJV falls within the guidelines of traditional theories.   
Although recognizing the conditions necessary to cooperate for the future is important, it 
is only the first step.  After determining whether or not cooperation for the future is applicable, 
the next process for both companies is the ability for them to become vulnerable enough towards 
each other in order to become an integrated and successful IJV.    
Table 1 How to Recognize ‘Cooperating for the Future’. The table below shows whether or not a company 
should engage in a joint-venture with a competitor.  The table also reveals the conditions necessary so that 
cooperating for the future can occur. 
 
5.2. Becoming Vulnerable, But Separate 
Once both companies have discerned that cooperating for the future is ideal for their 
joint-venture situation, they will need to actively implement conditions within their companies’ 
infrastructure to help their cooperative efforts succeed.   When considering the Ashkelon case, 
several factors may have helped IDE and Veolia to become a more integrated IJV, separate from 
their own individual, competing companies.   
First, VID was an off-site work place (Ashkelon Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse 
Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).  Both IDE and Veolia have separate offices in Israel, but 
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rather than one company joining the pre-existing work-site of the other, instead IDE and Veolia 
worked away from their respective offices on the site of the Ashkelon project itself.   
In addition, a neutral language, English, was used for VID’s venture (Ashkelon 
Desalination Plant, Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel, 2007).  Although IDE does 
business in Hebrew and Veolia works in French, both companies had a working knowledge of 
English within the culture of their companies before VID was created.  A common, neutral 
language can be beneficial for creating an IJV between competitors, this is because a company 
that works with its native language might have an advantage over the cooperating company that 
does not know or have the same ability within that language.   
Thirdly, as in the Ashkelon case, having similar levels of leadership among participants 
from both companies would help with knowledge sharing and general feelings of equality 
(Sauvet-Goichon, 2006).   
Furthermore, the IJV should have clear terms and goals from the onset.  VID was very 
concise and organized in putting its desalination project into action and this likely helped both 
IDE and Veolia to be more united when working together on site (Sauvet-Goichon, 2006).   
Finally, the promise of a shared glory, when included as part of the IJV’s culture, could 
help create a cooperative mindset between two competing companies.  As shown in chapters 3 
and 4, both IDE and Veolia’s individual reputations benefited greatly from their Ashkelon IJV 
because they shared the prize of success evenly.   
Overall, the above infrastructural suggestions are only a few methods which proved 
useful in the Ashkelon case and which could also be implemented into the culture and practice of 
new joint-ventures to better help them cooperate for the future.   
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5.3. Getting into the Mindset 
The preceding points discussed possible large-scale conditions which competitive 
companies can implement to assist their cooperative efforts for the future.  Yet, in addition to 
creating ideal cooperative conditions within the larger infrastructure of an IJV, companies should 
also consider smaller initiatives to help their employees enter a cooperative mindset when 
working with competitors for a temporary IJV period.   
The following list of suggestions is not meant to be comprehensive or a requirement of 
cooperating for the future; instead, the list should be used as a starting point to help companies 
and their managers discover methods that help their employees achieve a cooperative mindset 
when working side-by-side with competitors.  These ten suggestions may prove helpful in 
assisting companies in their creation of an “I need you and you need me” mentality within the 
IJV.  In addition, these suggestions might help to alleviate the immense amount of responsibility 
employees will feel to cooperate successfully. 
1. Decide from the onset how responsibilities will be delineated between the companies 
and make the outcome of this decision transparent to employees of both companies.  
This will allow employees to know what is expected of them from the beginning. 
2. Give a projection, via a written document or a team meeting, of the bigger picture that 
working with a competitor can afford both companies.  If employees can understand 
the incentive to cooperate, they could be more willing and enthusiastic to do so. 
3. Although it is recommended that the work of the IJV be done at a neutral location, it 
could be beneficial for both companies to host a general tour within non-competitive 
areas of their company building.  Allowing a competitor to have an official tour of 
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company facilities could help to facilitate a feeling of “visitor” rather than of 
“competitor” among employees of both companies. 
4. Although it is standard for company CEOs and Presidents to present speeches at 
official IJV gatherings (such as breaking ground, etc.), presentations should also be 
done by lead engineers and other employees who are on the field directly cooperating 
and contributing to the IJV regularly.  These speeches can be fed via a live video feed 
to all employees of both companies so that all employees are updated and have an 
understanding of the IJV.   
5. A brief course for employees about the differences they might expect to encounter 
when working with personnel from the competing company should be offered.  Such 
a course could help prevent problems between cooperating employees before they 
potentially arise. 
6. The IJV could also use a web work-space, such as Google Documents or Microsoft 
Workspace, to allow employees from both companies the chance to connect and 
interact with IJV documents in real-time.  A virtual work-space might lesson the 
difficulties associated with long distances and/or possible misinterpretations of body 
language which might occur between cooperating employees from both companies.   
7. The cooperating companies should inform and update outside organizations, such as 
government or non-governmental officials, since such organizations could lend media 
support to the IJV’s goals of making a global impact through the use of technology.  
By making third party organizations aware of the IJV’s efforts, employees and the 
world at large may be more able to identify with and become inspired by the IJV’s 
goal. 
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8. Rather than having an official presentation or learning course, or perhaps even in 
addition to these ideas, a short documentary could be created and posted on the 
websites of both companies.  The documentary could interview leaders and 
employees from both companies and share their visions in a cohesive storyline about 
the breakthrough technology which both companies hope to create by cooperating 
together.  The companies could also place this short video on Youtube.com and 
thereby double the initiative as an advertising effort to begin building awareness of 
their IJV and enhancing their reputations.   
9. Of course, as with any joint venture, it is important to officially involve the media to 
create an excitement in the work place, as well as in the greater community, about the 
IJV and its goals.   
10. Finally, casual social events should be planned between both cooperating companies.  
Such an event could be as simple as employees bringing their favorite national food 
and having a potluck-style lunch hour.  However, it would probably be best to 
maintain gatherings on the official IJV site so as to instill a sense of formality to the 
occasion; after all, it would not be desirable for employees to divulge sensitive 
information about their respective companies. 
Whenever two competing companies work together temporarily, any or all of the above 
suggestions could be used as smaller-scale initiatives to help companies create a cooperative 
mindset and framework for their employees.  
5.4. Final Remarks on Cooperating for the Future  
Therefore, it is possible for two competing companies to recognize whether or not 
cooperating for the future by creating an advanced technology for an emerging market is an ideal 
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approach.  Companies can consider this by addressing the above Table 1.  In addition, as the 
Ashkelon case reveals, it is possible for cooperating companies to implement suggestions into 
their respective company infrastructures by becoming vulnerable enough with each other while 
still remaining separate entities.  Furthermore, in addition to larger-scale infrastructural 
suggestions, there are smaller-scale recommendations which cooperating companies can utilize 
to assist their employees in temporarily – yet meaningfully – cooperating with competitors.   
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6. Conclusion 
 As Collins reasons, companies must create advanced technologies to remain competitive 
continuously (Collins et al., 1999, 8).  The argument of this thesis demonstrates that it is possible 
for competing technological companies to cooperate in the creation of an innovative technology 
in order to become more competitive – even against one another – into the future.  Such 
cooperating for the future can be achieved if competing technological companies form an IJV to 
create a technological milestone for an emerging global market.   
A review of existing literature between cooperation among competing companies was 
discussed.  After highlighting both the challenges and motivations for creating an IJV, the pre-
existing IJV theories proved to be insufficient when considered against the Ashkelon case.  As a 
result, a contingency approach of cooperating for the future was suggested.  Within the topic of 
cooperation among competing technologies, the cooperating for the future approach provides an 
additional motivation for competitors to cooperate given that the participants form an IJV to 
create a novel technology for an emerging market. 
Furthermore, the possible rewards of competitors choosing to cooperate for the future 
were discussed, including an enhanced reputation for the cooperating competitors, greater 
contract potentials for both companies and overall higher future profits.  Lastly, an option for 
further research was considered; specifically, the significance an IJV with symmetrically-sized 
participants which cooperates for the future requires more research.  
Finally, recommendations were provided for company managers who are considering the 
formation of an IJV with a competing technological company in order to cooperate for the future.  
Above all, a chart was provided to aid managers in recognizing whether or not an opportunity to 
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cooperate for the future existed.  Moreover, specific large-scale and small-scale infrastructural 
suggestions for an IJV composed of competing technological companies were given. 
In conclusion, Hamel and Prahalad reason that the difference between competition for the 
future and competition for the present will be “the prospect of making an impact, rather than the 
certitude of immediate financial returns” (Hamel et al. 1994, Vol. 12 35).  In a similar way, the 
cooperating for the future approach demonstrates that making an impact by creating a 
technological breakthrough for an emerging global market can also provide significant financial 
rewards.  Furthermore, even though the financial reward might not be immediate when 
cooperating for the future (since companies must first navigate cooperation with their 
competitors); nevertheless, the financial profits could prove to be sizeable and long-term.  
Overall, the approach of this thesis reveals an additional motivation (breakthrough technology 
and emerging market) which can be considered by competing technology companies who, based 
on pre-existing challenges and motivations, might not have considered forming an IJV otherwise.
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